Sam McChesney

and I'm a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at Northwestern University.

I study ancient Greek political thought, critical theory, and hermeneutics.

You can contact me at samuelmcchesney2023@u.northestern.edu.

About Me

My primary areas of research are classical political thought, critical antiquities, ethics, and the work of Hannah Arendt. My dissertation, “Political Courage,” aims to rethink courage — traditionally a military and aristocratic virtue — from a democratic perspective, drawing on both classical Athenian and modern political thought.

I also draw extensively on hermeneutics and the philosophy of language, democratic theory, feminist theory, and the works of Thucydides, Plato, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Michel Foucault. My work lies at the intersection of historical, normative, and critical theory.

In addition, I have written and lectured on Renaissance/early modern political theory, including Montaigne, Machiavelli, and Hobbes.

My work has been published in The European Legacy and Labyrinth.

I hail from Aotearoa New Zealand, and have an MA and a BA(Hons) from Otago University. I've lived in Chicago since 2018, and when I'm not reading about ancient Athens you can find me cheering on the Chicago Sky.

You can find my full C.V. here.

Research

My dissertation addresses the perplexities of "political courage." Most treatments of political courage treat it as analogous to martial courage, and characterize it phenomenologically as an affirmation of an “inside” and a struggle against an “outside.” In this way, courage has often been seen as an "ambivalent" political virtue: alongside the association of courage with heroic struggles for justice, courage has also been linked to stubbornness, xenophobia, and belligerence. The aim of my dissertation is not to reject the importance of martial courage for politics. Political life frequently involves causes to be fought for and adversaries to face. Nonetheless, the conceptual imperialism of this account of courage has deeply distorting effects on our understanding of politics and of courage. My aim is to show that political courage is distinct from martial courage, and contains an irreducible aspect of openness to change: both change within the political world of things and relations, and change to the distinctions and exclusions that ground individuals’ identities.

The dissertation proceeds primarily through a critique of Classical Athenian writings, including philosophical treatises, historical works, plays, and speeches, emphasizing the ways in which courage is invoked and problematized by their authors. The first chapter addresses the tensions of political courage in classical Athens. I argue that the distinction between war (polemos) and civil war (stasis) testifies to an uncertain and contested relation of martial courage to political courage. Stasis was feared not just for its violence and devastation but for its corrupting influence on words, especially andreia (courage or manliness). Stasis signifies a situation in which the masculinism of courage and the structural violence that stabilized its signification could be radically contested. The second chapter looks to Foucault’s lectures on parrhēsia, or courageous truth-telling. In this chapter, I turn to an under-theorized figure in the “game” of parrhēsia: the democratic citizen who listens to harsh truths. Through this figure, I assess the possibilities of courageous listening as a critical and nourishing democratic practice. Finally, the third chapter turns to the Greek traveler and the risky endeavor of giving and seeking hospitality. By accepting outsiders into their spaces, Greeks both created networks that could enrich and even save their lives; they could also set in motion events that bring down the power of kings.

Publications

Journal articles

“Hermeneutic Courage: What Gadamer (and Arendt) Can Tell Us About Political Thinking,” Labyrinth 24, no. 2 (2022): 44–68.
Abstract: [Show] [Hide] Hans-Georg Gadamer, despite his exchanges with and reception by major figures in the field of political theory, is often thought of as a philosopher as opposed to a political theorist. For instance, the title of one of his essays, “On the Political Incompetence of Philosophy,” is sometimes taken to indicate that Gadamer thought of his own philosophy as “politically incompetent” (Code 2003, 15). In this paper, I argue that Gadamer’s hermeneutic philosophy is deeply concerned with our relation to the political world. To bring out these political concerns, I put Gadamer in conversation with Hannah Arendt, who overtly disavowed philosophy in favor of political theory. I show that Gadamer and Arendt share many of the same worries about the solitary model of much philosophy—particularly that of Heidegger—and that both try to promote a more involved, worldly mode of thinking. For Arendt, this mode of thinking attends in large part to the newness and distinctiveness of other people, whereas Gadamer emphasizes what other people say and how we must relate to them if we are to understand what they are telling us. I argue that although these are complementary ways of addressing political thinking, one important advantage of Gadamer’s account is the way it brings into view the centrality of courage for understanding our shared political world. Because understanding frequently requires that we question our identities and renegotiate our existing relation to the world in often uncomfortable ways, political thinking involves what I call “hermeneutic courage.”
“The Meaning of Courage in Montaigne’s Essays,” The European Legacy 26, no. 2 (February 17, 2021): 131–48.
Abstract: [Show] [Hide] One of the most enduring puzzles of courage is its relation to technical or instrumental reason and the power such reason brings. For Michel de Montaigne (1533–92), the conquest of the New World showed that classical, aristocratic valour was a dying paradigm: if all struggles can be settled by a test of power and skill, courage appears to be obsolete. Thus, the very meaning of courage is to be found in its opposition to instrumentalism. For Montaigne, the purely instrumental concerns of power and skill have no meaning in themselves, but aspire to an omnipotence through which an understanding of the self and its world evaporates. A god can never possess self-knowledge because self-knowledge is forged through opposition and struggle and under conditions of finitude. The attempt to transcend or avoid this struggle (and the courage that this struggle requires of us) through the application of ontic method is both cowardly and futile. The self is an inescapably finite, horizonal being embedded in a world of flux and plurality. Courage, for Montaigne, therefore relates to an awareness, as opposed to a denial, of human limitations. This is, I argue, a valuable contribution to our understanding of the virtue of courage, but it is not the last word. Montaigne’s concern to embrace our status as finite creatures often manifested in a problematic praise of poverty, suffering, and death.

Book reviews

“Rehearsals of Manhood: Athenian Drama as Social Practice, by John J. Winkler [Review].” The European Legacy 29, no.2 (2024): 238–40.

Conferences

As presenter

April 2024. “Parrhēsia and the matter of listening in Foucault.” Midwest Political Science Association Conference. Chicago, Illinois.
March 2024. “Parrhēsia and the matter of listening in Foucault.” Western Political Science Association Conference. Vancouver, BC.
April 2023. “Tearing the roof off: Political courage and the problem of stasis.” Western Political Science Association Conference. San Francisco, California.
March 2023. “Discovering the other’s voice: Arendt and world-traveling.” Hannah Arendt Center: Judgment, Pluralism, and Democracy Conference. Annandale-on-Hudson, New York.
April 2021. “Soldier, citizen, wanderer: Hannah Arendt and the paradigms of courage.” Midwest Political Science Association Conference. Chicago, Illinois.
November 2018. “The Delphic task: Courage and self-knowledge in Montaigne’s Essays.” Graduate Student Political Theory Workshop. Evanston, Illinois. November 2017. “Montaigne’s concept of courage.” New Zealand Political Studies Association Conference. Dunedin, New Zealand.

As discussant

March 2024. Patrick Giamario (UNC Greensboro), “Rule by not-knowing: The philosophical sorcery of the Noble Lie.” Western Political Science Association Conference. Vancouver, BC.
May 2021. Daniela Cammack (UC Berkeley), “Representation in Ancient Greek democracy.” Graduate Student Political Theory Workshop. Evanston, Illinois.
April 2021. Gaye Ilhan Demiryol (Bogazici University), “Truth-telling as world-building.” Midwest Political Science Association Conference. Chicago, Illinois.

Teaching

Instructor of record (University of Otago)

Summer 2018. Course: Power and Liberty.
Summer 2017. Course: Power and Liberty.

Teaching assistant (Northwestern University)

Spring 2022. Course: Introduction to Political Theory. Instructor: Shmulik Nili.
Spring 2021. Course: National Security. Instructor: Jeff Rice.
Winter 2021. Course: Ancient Greek History and Culture. Instructor: Jonah Radding.
Fall 2020. Course: Introduction to Political Theory. Instructor: Julia Brown.
Spring 2020. Course: Roman History and Culture. Instructor: Taco Terpstra.
Winter 2020. Course: Ancient Greek History and Culture. Instructor: Jonah Radding.
Fall 2019. Course: Introduction to Political Theory. Instructor: Loubna El Amine.

Guest lecturer

Spring 2022. Thomas Hobbes: Equality, Authority, and Nature. Northwestern University.
Fall 2011. Political Emotions. Otago University.

Graphic Design

Posters designed for the Northwestern Graduate Student Political Theory Workshop. (Click to view.)

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